

The Impact of Civil Society's Human Rights Articulations on Securitization in Ethno-Political Conflicts. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

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The following paper first presents the results of the comparative work of the SHUR project on human rights and civil society in ethno-political conflicts, funded by the European Commission in the 6th framework program. In the project we want to explore the possible impacts that human rights articulations of civil society organizations can have on ethno-political conflicts. We did four case studies – on Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, and Bosnia and Herzegovina – based on a common research design (see working papers on the SHUR website <http://www.luiss.it/shur>). This design was mainly inspired by the so-called securitization theory. In contrast to other comparative research within the project, we focus in our comparative work on the *conditions for a positive or negative – securitizing or de-securitizing – impact of civil society organizations' human rights articulations on the conflict.*

Our comparative research deals with two aspects: first, we want to identify those factors that affect how human rights articulations make securitization or de-securitization more likely. The four case studies offer a broad range of examples, because while all four conflicts are characterized as having a strong ethno-political component, they are otherwise very different in the basic criteria we established. Our second goal is to identify factors in the various case studies that significantly affect the impact of human rights articulations. This analysis, based on the existing case study data – largely collected via interviews – is an essential first step in comparative analysis.

In the **first section** of our paper we will summarize the research design of SHUR and our

understanding of securitization theory as a theoretical framework of conflict that provides an understanding and explanation for conflict escalation and de-escalation. In the **second section** we will apply our comparative research to civil society studies, and in securitization studies in general, to show the contribution of SHUR to both areas of research. Our research methodology is outlined in **section three**. We used the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) Method developed by Charles Ragin in the mid-1980s as a more formalized analysis for comparing the case studies' qualitative data. Especially in the context of post-modern and constructivist securitization studies this is quite unusual, but as we will show, this formal analysis helps us to identify the key conditions that are relevant in analyzing securitization processes. In response to the demand by several authors for case studies and more comparative research to develop a comprehensive securitization theory, we chose to use QCA to identify variables relevant for explaining why, under certain circumstances, human rights articulations can contribute to the securitization of a conflict. In **section four** we present the first results of evaluating the case studies and we close with some preliminary comparative conclusions.

1. Securitization theory as the theoretical framework

In this section we will clarify our understanding of the securitization theory as a tool for explaining the impact of human rights articulations made by civil society, or – as we referred to it – conflict society organizations (CoSOs), on ethno-political conflicts. Securitization theory is used here as a conflict theory, although securitization could be described as a form of conflict escalation by referring to a conflict issue as a security issue or a conflict party as a threat (see also Gromes & Bonacker 2007; Diez & Pia 2007).

In a nutshell, securitization means that an issue or an actor (a referent object) is framed as a security issue (e.g. something or somebody is perceived as a threat to a group's identity). According to Wæver, security per se does not exist in a vacuum, but is constructed through communication. Referring to Austin's speech act theory, Wæver suggests that "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it" (Wæver 1995: 55).

Securitization consists of three components:

1. the claim that a threat to survival exists and the demand for extraordinary measures,
2. the adoption of emergency action, and
3. the effects on the relations between the affected units by violating rules that otherwise bind (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde 1998: 25).

A security issue is something that requires priority over all others, because “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or free to deal with it in our own way)” (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde 1998: 24). In this sense, securitization is equal to conflict escalation, because it transforms a normal discourse – about freedom of expression, for example – into panic politics.

It is important to distinguish between a *securitizing move* and *securitization*. Asserting an existential threat and requesting extraordinary means constitute a securitizing move. An issue becomes securitized only if an audience accepts the allegation that an existential threat exists and approves a response by emergency measures. Thus, securitization is an intersubjective practice: “security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but *among* the subjects (...)” (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde 1998: 31, emphasis in the original). The “securityness” of an issue or a conflict party is therefore defined by an agreement between a securitizing actor and the addressed audience regarding the object of a securitizing move (see Roe 2008).

If, for example, a CoSO suggests that an ethnic group has a right to speak its own language and that a state law against the expression of cultural independence is a violation of this group’s identity, this could lead to a securitizing move by the CoSO if the state is openly presented as a threat. In this case, the CoSO is addressing, speaking for, and trying to mobilize the ethnic group. If this mobilization is effective, if the addressed audience accepts the securitizing move, we can refer to it as securitization. There is then a demand for extraordinary measures to successfully react to the threat. Language as a specific form of articulation of human rights would, in this case, securitize the point of conflict. It is also possible in principle that an unapproved securitization could lead to extraordinary measures. As Paul Roe (2008: 616) recently pointed out, “although a given audience may well agree with the securitizing actor as to the 'securityness' of a given issue, this selfsame audience may also disagree over the 'extraordinaryness' of the measures proposed. Such a situation is not an example for failed securitization (as the audience did not reject the issue as 'security'), but nor is it a successful securitization, as the means necessary to deal with the issue are not also

intersubjectively established.” If one understands securitization as a communicative process, the acceptance of a communicated threat can be seen as a start to the securitization process, which usually ends in the acceptance of the extraordinary measures. The main effect of uttering the word “security” is its *potential* to lead to an audience tolerating violations of given and accepted rules that would otherwise have been obeyed (Stritzel 2007: 361).

What is interesting about the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory from a conflict theoretical point of view is that it can be used to define more accurately what a conflict is and how it evolves: “We observe a conflict when actors articulate an incompatibility by referring to another as an existential threat to itself” (Diez & Stetter & Albert 2006: 566). Contrary to that definition and maybe more in line with securitization theory, we would say that threat communication is an escalation of a previous conflict. Thus, conflict escalations emerge from this perpetual threat communication that Wæver describes as securitization. Let us examine a simple example: the relationship between government and opposition. This relationship is conflictive by nature, because both parties tend to formulate opinions that are perceived as mutually exclusive. We speak of an institutionalized, and thus stable, conflict in the heart of the political system. The conflict escalates the instant that normal political conflict communication turns into threat communication, because the opponents on the one side are perceived as a threat by the other. Normal observations within the system become securitized observations; the normal observer becomes a threatened observer. The stronger the threat is to one’s own identity, the more likely the danger of escalation. To frame an issue as an existential threat is to transfer it to an agenda of panic politics. In most cases the adoption of extraordinary means implies escalation. Escalation leads to a violent or more violent conflict, de-escalation reduces the scale of violence or ends the use of violent means all together. Since securitization is viewed as conflict escalation, this also means that securitization is (always) embedded in a conflict as a social system or as a social and political context that is crucial for the relationship between the securitizing actor and the significant audience. With Stritzel (2007: 367) we would argue that “an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant.” The conflict context therefore should be seen as highly relevant for an analysis of the impact human rights articulations can have on the securitization or de-securitization of ethno-political conflicts.

Hence, securitization theory allows for an analytical approach to the procedural nature of conflicts that are constructed by means of communication. Conflicts are understood as self-selective social processes that materialize from the realm of communication. Although securitization theory does not itself offer a model of conflict escalation phases, it provides a number of constructivist tools that

would in fact enable a process-related model (see Diez & Stetter & Albert 2006) and would help to explain how conflicts develop and progress – and can essentially be transformed by de-securitizing conflict communication (i.e. by moving issues off the security agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and normal political dispute and accommodation (see Williams 2003: 523)).

We have underlined the communicative aspects of conflict and securitization in this context in order to highlight the fact that we regard securitization as a process of conflict escalation. Conflicts do not begin with securitization, but securitization means that a conflict party or point of conflict is seen as a threat. CoSOs can make human rights articulations in “normal” conflict situations, meaning the articulation is not a contribution to the securitization of the conflict. And it is of course possible that human rights articulations are made in conflicts that have already been securitized. This is the starting point of the project, as the conflicts we researched are all characterized by a certain level of securitization.

According to our research design, **CoSOs** can play at least three different roles in securitizing or de-securitizing ethno-political conflicts:

1. as an **actor** that applies extraordinary measures or decides to go back to normal politics (civil society activities as a means of *initiating* securitization or de-securitization)
2. as a **speaker** that claims the use of extraordinary measures or the return to normal politics (civil society activities as a means of *fostering* securitization or de-securitization)
3. as an **audience** that replies to a securitizing or de-securitizing move (civil society activities as a means of *resisting* securitization or de-securitization)

We therefore needed to look not only at the CoSOs themselves, but also at the external actors and the addressed audiences of the different actions in order to find out which role the CoSOs are playing in the process of securitization and de-securitization.

Human rights articulations can contribute to the securitization or de-securitization of a conflict. Applying securitization theory we distinguished three possible impacts of CoSO human rights articulations:

(a) Securitization takes place when:

1. the CoSO is reacting (with a securitizing move) to a securitizing move of an external speaker and therefore (with the approval of emergency actions) makes it possible that others adopt extraordinary measures, or

2. the CoSO itself is adopting extraordinary measures in the course of a securitizing move by some other actor, or
3. the CoSO sees an existential threat to itself, to human rights, or to individuals or a group that the CoSO feels itself responsible for. It calls for extraordinary measures, which are approved by an audience and applied.

(b) Non-securitization takes place when securitization does not take place even though a securitizing move was applied. There are two possible reasons for this:

1. **Prevented securitization:** the CoSO is reacting – with a non-securitizing move (e.g. claiming that an existential threat does not exist or claiming that the securitizing actor does not have the legitimacy to claim extraordinary measures) – to a securitizing move of an external speaker and therefore is able to prevent securitization, or
2. **Failed securitization:** the CoSO sees an existential threat to itself, to human rights, or to individuals or a group that the CoSO feels itself responsible for. It calls for extraordinary measures, but the addressed audience does not approve, so that they are not adopted.

As the CoSO plays two fundamentally different roles in the process of non-securitization (in the first as an adversary of securitization and in the second as a supporter of securitization), we explicitly distinguished between them.

(c) Desecuritization takes place when:

1. the CoSO is reacting (with a de-securitizing move) to a de-securitizing move of an external speaker and therefore (with the approval of going back to normal politics) makes it possible that others leave the realm of panic politics, or
2. the CoSO itself leaves the realm of panic politics, or
3. the CoSO is claiming (with a de-securitizing move) to go back to normal politics and succeeds because the addressed audience leaves the realm of panic politics.

Finally we also found situations in which *none* of the mentioned mechanisms applies. The outcome of these actions is listed as “no observable impact on the securitization process”.

These clear-cut definitions (together with the not yet mentioned independent variables like the political opportunity structure or the political identity of the CoSO) allow us to do more formalized comparative research based largely on the qualitative data out of the four case studies.

To measure the impact of human rights articulations we distinguished three types of variables: (a) contextual variables, (b) actor specific variables, and (c) action specific variables.

(a) According to the relevance of the context of securitization processes mentioned above we paid much attention to contextual variables – which is a bit unusual for securitization studies. We distinguished here between variables describing the context of an ethno-political conflict (context conditions, CC1-CC4) like the nature of the state, the stage of democracy, the level of human rights development, and the presence of the international community, and variables concerning the political opportunity structure (POS) like the timing of conflict, the acceptance of human rights in a CoSO, the development of civil society, and the type of engagement of international actors in human rights affairs (for the discussion of the variables, see the SHUR working papers, especially Marchetti & Tocci 2007, Pia & Diez 2007).

(b) CoSOs in our framework function as securitizing or de-securitizing actors. To describe the wide range of actors we differentiated between four possible political identities of CoSOs: a civic/post-national, a multi-culturalist, an assimilationist, and an ethnicist identity (see Marchetti & Tocci 2007).

(c) Concerning the speech act or the human rights articulation of a CoSO itself we used three different variables to describe it: the framework of action, the type of invoked right, and the content of action. Especially the **type of invoked rights** is crucial here: exclusive individual rights are rights that are universal, but only invoked for *one* specific ethnic group (e.g. the right to life and freedom of the Kurds). Inclusive individual rights are universal rights that do not refer to *any* groups and are invoked for every human being to the same extent (e.g. the right to life and liberty, freedom of expression, or equality before the law). Exclusive collective rights are rights that refer to, and are invoked for, *one* specific ethnic group (e.g. the right to speak Kurdish in parliament, government agencies, and courts; the right to create local and national self-governing councils for Kurds; or the right to establish Kurdish schools and universities). And finally inclusive collective rights are rights of ethnic groups that are invoked for more than one ethnic group or do not refer to a *specific* ethnic group at all (e.g. the right of different ethnic groups to create local and national self-governing councils or the principle of equal political, social, economic, or cultural opportunities among them).

The following table shows all variables and the parameter values:

CC1 Existence/ Nature of State	CC2 Nature of Democracy	CC3 Level of Human Rights Development	CC4 International Presence	Political Identity of CoSO	Framework of Action	Type of invoked Right	Content of action	POS (C4) Timing	POS (C2) Acceptance of HRs in CoSOs	POS (C6) Civil Society	POS (C3) External Actors	Impact
State exists	Non-democratic	Human Rights are formally given and respected	No International Presence	Civic / Post-national	Conflict Escalation	Exclusive individual Right	Political	Low intensity Conflict	Hardly accepted in CoSOs	Hardly existent Civil Society	International Community (IC) neglects Conflict	Securitization
Failed State	Partly democratic	Human Rights are formally given but not respected	International Presence as Conflict Party (one side)	Multi-culturalist	Management	Inclusive individual Right	Cultural / Educational	Escalation	Sacrificed to political aims by most CoSOs	Developing Civil Society	IC ideologically backs Human Rights Initiatives	Prevented securitization
State not existent / Anarchy	Nationalistic democratic (Democracy for 1 Part of Population)	State/authority neglects Human Rights	Peacebuilding / Peacekeeping Mission	Assimilationist	Resolution	Exclusive collective Right	Humanitarian	High intensity conflict	Growing importance in CoSOs as an ideological framework	Effectively working Civil Society	IC backs Human Rights financially or militarily	Failed Securitization
Territory occupied by Force	Democracy	State/authority acts against Human Rights	Major International Presence	Ethnicist	Transformation	Inclusive collective Right	Research / Monitoring	De-escalation	Acceptance is basis for work of most CoSOs	Civil Society up to Western Standard	IC backs Human Rights through ECHR	No observable impact on the securitization process

2. SHUR in the context of civil society and securitization studies

In this section we want to link the SHUR project (a) to the increasing research on the role of NGOs in conflict dynamics and peace processes and (b) to the expanding field of securitization studies.

(a) In civil society studies there is an ongoing debate on the role of civil society organizations in ethno-political conflict. The increase in research is likely a consequence of the growing number and importance of NGOs and civil society actors during and after conflicts. Many commentators see the increased activities and levels of NGO engagement, especially in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as a positive development. According to Paul van Tongeren, the Secretary General of the civil society network Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, NGOs have the ability to a) function without being constrained by foreign policy imperatives, b) achieve access to areas inaccessible to state or international actors, c) talk to several parties without losing their credibility, d) deal directly with local populations, e) operate in confidentiality without media or public opinion, and f) effectively network, given their longstanding relationships, built on trust, with civil society in the conflict zones (see van Tongeren 1998: 23).

At the same time, scholars of peace and conflict studies have argued that NGOs can also play a negative or ambivalent role in ethno-political conflicts. Oliver Richmond (2008) has shown that NGOs involved in peacebuilding are also promoters of the liberal peace ideal, which can lead to more conflict. If we understand 'civil society' more as an analytical rather than as a normative concept, it becomes obvious that NGOs can also foster conflicts, such as is obviously the case for racist groups.

In this context, the relevance of SHUR is twofold: first, we want to explain the conditions that lead to positive or negative impacts of CoSO human rights-related activities. Second, most of the research on CoSOs during and after ethno-political conflicts focuses on NGOs as actors and therefore, in our opinion, doesn't explain their impact, but rather their intentions and motives.

In contrast, rather than focusing primarily on the actors and their motives, the securitization theory focuses on the actions and understands securitization as a process, which takes place via securitizing actions and the responses of the addressed audience. For this reason, we did not look first at the actors, their strategies, and their motivations, but rather at the articulations, which the public reacted to. We will determine the role of CoSOs in ethno-political conflicts by assessing the outcomes of their actions. In this context, the research question from SHUR is: in what situations do CoSO actions contribute to the securitization or de-securitization of a conflict?

In addition, most of the research is case study work with a focus on single NGOs or single conflict cases and therefore not comparative in a strict sense. SHUR wants to go a step further by trying to analyze the conditions across case studies.

(b) The securitization concept developed by the Copenhagen School has been heavily criticized since the mid-1990s, but it has also continued to develop (see Gromes & Bonacker 2007).

The QCA methods of comparative analysis of case studies can contribute to the development of securitization theory, especially in three particular aspects of security studies: first, most authors complain that there are not enough case study comparative analyses. Development of theories is fundamentally possible via conceptual methods or through empirical, theory-guided analysis. Up to now, the theory has been for the most part developed conceptually or through single case study analyses. One rare exception is the EU BorderConf Project (compare to Diez & Stetter & Albert 2008). SHUR attempts to fill these holes by comparing four cases that are relatively similar in regard to securitization processes. All four cases deal with securitized conflicts with strong ethno-political characteristics. On the other hand, each conflict has such stark differences that one can refer to the analysis as a “most different case” design.

Second, securitization studies were repeatedly accused of focusing too much on the verbal acts as context factors. In addition, the conditions for success of securitization are too rarely addressed. Stritzel (2007: 364) refers in this context to “facilitating conditions” that are necessary, although not necessarily always sufficient, for a securitizing move to lead to securitization. In our comparative analysis, it is exactly these conditions that are focused on. The QCA analysis attempts to find out which variables contribute to human rights articulations having a securitizing or de-securitizing effect.

Third, Vuori (2008) recently argued that the securitization theory has an implicit “democratic bias”, as extraordinary measures are often referred to as breaking democratic rules. “If the purpose of securitization studies is to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who can securitize, which issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what kinds of effects, and under which conditions (what explains when securitization has been successful), it is useful to investigate security speech in as many contexts as possible” (Vuori 2008: 68). The work of SHUR can also be understood as an attempt to put this “democratic bias” in perspective, because we empirically investigate which role the political system and the stage of democracy play in the securitization of

human rights articulations.

To summarize, we want to investigate – via formal comparative analysis of qualitative data of the case studies – which of the above-mentioned variables is significant in affecting whether human rights articulations have a securitization or de-securitization effect.

3. Qualitative Comparative Analysis

The method of QCA can be considered as a balance between case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches. Therefore it is able to integrate the key strengths of both qualitative (case-oriented) and quantitative (variable-oriented) research strategies (Ragin 1987: 34-82).

On the one hand causal conditions regarded as being capable of determining a specific outcome have to be selected before the formal analysis can take place, on the other hand QCA reveals contradictions within the data which can be used to revise these preliminary conditions and hypothesises (Ragin 1994: 309). Once causal conditions have been selected, cases characterized by the same combination of conditions are examined to see if they agree on the outcome variable. Disagreements can be taken as a sign that the preliminary specification of causal variables was either incorrect or incomplete. The close examination of cases that have the same values on the causal variables yet display contrasting outcomes can be used as a basis for revising the former codification of values or selecting additional causal variables. The investigator is able to move back and forth between the specification of causal variables and their values and the examination of specific cases. In that way a constant dialog between facts and theory can be established.

Furthermore QCA is based on the idea of multiple conjunctural causation (Ragin 1987: 19-33). Ragin stresses that first „no value on any variable [...] can be understood in isolation, but only in the context of the values of other relevant variables“ and second „different combinations of causes may produce the same outcome“ (Ragin 1994: 306). This makes it possible to examine interactions between variables and preserves the possibility that the same outcome could have emerged from very different preconditions.

Referring to our project conjunctural causation would mean that the outcome of one action is mainly defined by combinations of the conditions – rather than by one of the conditions – shown in the table on page 10. One possible result could for example be that in time of high intensity conflict an action by an ethnicist CoSO that is operating in the framework of escalation always leads to securitization. We then would have three parameter values – high intensity conflict, ethnicist CoSO, and framework escalation – that only in combination – not as single ones – define the outcome of

securitization.

Using the same three conditions – but different values – we could however also have “low intensity conflict” as timing, “assimilationist” as political identity of the CoSO and again “conflict escalation” as framework of action and come to the same outcome. This would be the element of multiple causation which allows more than one combination to produce the same outcome.

What QCA can do is to show us different combinations of our conditions that led to a specific outcome. In doing this it minimizes the result by erasing irrelevant factors. In our example both the factor timing as well as the political identity of the CoSO can be seen as irrelevant factors because they simply did not effect the outcome as long as the action was done in the framework of escalation. During the search of a necessary condition the same process of minimization takes place. In that way QCA simplifies the comparison of actions enormously.

Another major advantage of QCA is the transparency of calculation which – by using the Boolean Algebra – is not influenced by subjective inputs. But of course this only applies to the calculation itself, not to the codification of the data that has to take place before the calculation can start.

Before using QCA the information gathered in the interviews and the case study work had to be transferred into rather simple tables. Therefore we had to generate specific variables and parameter values to describe the different actions, actors and contexts. In order to still provide a relatively broad spectrum of selectable categories for each action we created 12 independent conditions and four possible values for each of them. As mentioned before the outcome variable even had to be split into five possible values.

In one last step the information was converted into truth tables – describing each value with the numbers 0 to 3 for the independent variables and 0 to 4 for the dependent variable – to make it suitable for the computer calculations.

For in QCA originally variables could only have two values we were not able to use simple QCA anymore but had to operate with an advanced method called MVQCA (Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis) which has been developed by Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Lasse Cronqvist to avoid the substantial loss of information that was linked to the dichotomization of the original QCA (Berg-Schlosser & Cronqvist 2009; Cronqvist 2007). MVQCA and the corresponding Tool TOSMANA (Tool for Small-N Analysis)¹ have been extremely helpful for us.

¹ For more information see also <http://www.tosmana.net/>.

4. The Case Studies

In **Cyprus** we were assessing actions of 22 CoSOs that all had taken place between 1989 and 2007. Over this period of time the context conditions and the political opportunity structure of the Turkish part in the north and the Greek part in the south had been very alike. In the two of them actions took place within the context of a low intensity conflict and a nationalistic democratic state where human rights were formally given but not respected. Although the local civil society was effectively working and the importance of human rights within the ideological framework of local CoSOs was growing, the International Community was involved by maintaining a peacebuilding/peacekeeping mission on the one hand and ideologically backing Cypriot human rights initiatives on the other hand.

Among the 22 CoSOs we were focussing on we classified seven as civic/postnational, six as assimilationist, five as ethnicist and four as multi-culturalist. 82 percent² of their actions were political, nine percent humanitarian and another nine percent had been actions in the context of research/monitoring. 36 percent of these actions led to securitization, another 36 percent to de-securitization and 28 percent did not have an observable impact on the securitization process.

The framework escalation could be determined as the necessary as well as sufficient condition of securitization. Furthermore all of the securitizing actions were political, initiated by ethnicist or assimilationist CoSOs and invoking an exclusive collective right. However, not all of the (political) actions carried out by ethnicist or assimilationist CoSOs and/or invoking an exclusive collective right led to securitization. As a matter of fact some of them did not visibly influence the securitization process at all.

De-securitization took place if and only if actions were done in the framework management or resolution or in the context of research/monitoring or providing humanitarian aid. This might be explained by the fact that in Cyprus all of the actions in the framework of management or resolution were carried out by civic³ or multi-culturalist⁴ CoSOs invoking an inclusive right⁵. Humanitarian actions and actions in the field of research/monitoring were only carried out by civic CoSOs invoking an inclusive individual right. Latter were only done in the framework of transformation. Actions did not have an observable impact on the securitization process if and only if they were political ones in the framework of transformation. These actions were done by all kinds of CoSOs invoking all kinds of rights so that this result cannot be explained by the CoSO's political identity

² The following information expressed as a percentage are round figures. Figures with five tenths have been adjusted upward.

³ 71 percent of the actions carried out by civic CoSOs led to de-securitization.

⁴ 75 percent of the actions carried out by multi-culturalist CoSOs led to de-securitization.

⁵ 73 percent of the actions invoking an inclusive right led to de-securitization.

or the type of the invoked right. It is also unclear why altogether – including all contents of actions – 75 percent of the actions in the framework of transformation do not have visible effect on the securitization process.

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina** we were considering actions of 19 CoSOs carried out between 1993 and 2007. Over this period of time CoSOs were basically confronted with two different context conditions and three different structures of political opportunities.

During the war years – from April 1992 until the autumn of 1995 – actions took place within an anarchic and non-democratic context where the state itself was acting against human rights. Over this time of high intensity conflict the International Community was maintaining a peacebuilding mission and ideologically backing human rights initiatives but the local civil society was hardly existent and most of the CoSOs sacrificed the acceptance of human rights to the achievement of political aims.

During the post-war era – from the end of 1995 until 2008 – we can speak of a partly democratic state where human rights were formally given and respected. This period of low intensity conflict was characterized by a major international presence backing human rights financially and militarily. For the acceptance of human rights within the CoSOs and the activity of local civil society was constantly growing we distinguished between a first post-war period – from 1995 to 2006 – with a growing importance of human rights within the ideological framework of CoSOs and a developing civil society and a second post-war period – from 2006 to 2007 – with the acceptance of human rights as the basis for the work of most CoSOs and an effectively working civil society.

Among the 19 CoSOs we were considering we classified 10 as multi-culturalist, seven as civic/postnational and two as ethnicist. 67 percent of their actions were political, 15 percent humanitarian, 13 percent cultural/educational and four percent had been actions in the context of research/monitoring. Eight percent of these actions led to securitization, 81 percent to de-securitization. 12 percent did not have an observable impact on the securitization process.

The framework escalation could again be determined as the necessary as well as sufficient condition of securitization. This applies to all of the actions initiated by ethnicist CoSOs but also to some of the multi-culturalist ones. Apart from the conflict-escalating mode of the action and the ethnicist character of the CoSO the invocation of an exclusive collective right could be determined as a third sufficient condition of securitization. Moreover all of the actions leading to securitization appeared to be either political or in the context of research/monitoring. A significant influence by the different context conditions or political opportunity structures could not be observed.

All of the de-securitizing actions were initiated by multi-culturalist or civic/postnational CoSOs

invocating an inclusive right⁶. Furthermore all of these actions were political, humanitarian or cultural/educational and took place in the framework of transformation, resolution or management. In Bosnia and Herzegovina cultural/educational actions always produced de-securitization. This might be explained by the fact that all of them were related to an invocation of an inclusive individual right. Humanitarian actions did only have a de-securitizing effect if they were carried out by a civic/postnational CoSO in the framework of transformation invoking an inclusive individual right. In cases where these three conditions were not given humanitarian actions did not have a visible impact on the securitizationprocess. A significant impact by the different context conditions or political opportunity structures could not be determined for the de-securitizationprocess.

All of the actions that did not have an observable impact on the securitizationprocess were initiated by civic/postnational or multi-culturalist CoSOs invoking an inclusive right⁷. Furthermore they took place in three different frameworks of action – transformation, resolution and management – so that this result cannot be explained by this specific condition. The only condition capable of explaining this outcome is the content of action for all of the actions having not a visible impact on the securitizationprocess were either humanitarian actions or actions in the context of research/monitoring. A significant impact by the different context conditions or political opportunity structures could not be determined.

In **Turkey** we covered the activities of 23 CoSOs from the beginning of the 1990s to the present time. Over this period the context conditions and the political opportunity structure of Turkey did not change to a great extent. CoSOs were operating within the context of a basically democratic state where human rights were formally given but not respected. During this time of low intensity conflict we can speak of a developing local civil society and a growing importance of human rights within the ideological framework of local CoSOs. Although there has been no international presence, human rights were backed through the European Court of Human Rights.

Among the 23 CoSOs we were focussing on we classified 10 as civic/postnational, eight as multi-culturalist, three as assimilationist and two as ethnicist. 48 percent of their actions were political, 20 percent humanitarian, eight percent cultural/educational and 25 percent had been actions in the context of research/monitoring. 18 percent of these actions led to securitization, 28 percent to de-securitizationand 43 percent did not have an observable impact on the securitization process. Apart from that we were also able to determine actions of failed and prevented securitization in Turkey.⁸

⁶ 95 percent were invoking an inclusive individual right, five percent an inclusive collective right.

⁷ 83 percent were invoking an inclusive individual right, 17 percent an inclusive collective right.

⁸ Eight percent of all the actions we were assessing could prevent securitization, five percent had been cases of failed securitization.

A political content of action accompanied by a conflict-escalating framework of action appeared to be the necessary as well as sufficient condition of securitization. That in Turkey the framework of escalation on its own could not be a necessary or sufficient condition of securitization becomes apparent from the cases of failed securitization where actions carried out in a conflict-escalating mode could not imply securitization. Actions producing securitization have been initiated by assimilationist, ethnicist as well as multi-culturalist CoSOs including all kinds of invoked rights. However, all of the securitizing actions carried out by multi-culturalist CoSOs were invoking a collective right.⁹

As in Bosnia and Herzegovina actions of de-securitization were always initiated by civic/postnational or multi-culturalist CoSOs invoking an inclusive right¹⁰. All of these actions have been political, cultural/educational or humanitarian. Furthermore the cultural/educational and humanitarian actions were all done in the framework of transformation. De-securitization always took place if civic/postnational CoSOs were operating in the framework of transformation. Framework transformation in conjunction with the invocation of an inclusive individual right could also be determined as a sufficient condition of de-securitization. This applies to the actions of civic/postnational CoSOs as well as to those of multi-culturalist ones.

Actions that did not have a visible impact on the securitization process were initiated by all kinds of CoSOs invoking all kinds of rights and having all kinds of contents. 76 percent of these actions were carried out in the framework of resolution, 24 percent in the framework of transformation. Most of these actions were either humanitarian or actions in the field of research/monitoring.¹¹ 75 percent of all humanitarian actions in Turkey could not observably influence the securitization process. The same applies to 70 percent of the actions in the context of research/monitoring.

All of the actions capable of preventing securitization have been actions of civic/postnational CoSOs in the framework of resolution invoking an inclusive right¹². This applies to political actions as well as to humanitarian actions and actions in the field of research/monitoring. While political actions could prevent securitization by invoking an inclusive collective right, humanitarian actions and actions in the context of research/monitoring were only able to do so by invoking an inclusive individual right.

securitizing moves that did not lead to securitization have been made by assimilationist and multi-

⁹ 50 percent of these actions have been invocations of an inclusive collective right, another 50 percent those of an exclusive collective right.

¹⁰ 64 percent were invoking an inclusive individual right, 36 percent an inclusive collective right.

¹¹ 41 percent of the actions having no visible impact on the securitization process have been actions in the field of research/monitoring, 35 percent appeared to be humanitarian, 18 percent were political and 6 percent cultural/educational.

¹² 67 percent of these actions were invoking an inclusive individual right, 33 percent an inclusive collective right.

culturalist CoSOs invoking an exclusive right¹³. All of these actions were actions in the field of research/monitoring.

In Turkey we were also confronted with a substantial amount of actions having exactly the same conditions but producing different outcomes. Actions with the same conditions have been actions of prevented securitization and de-securitization as well as actions that did not have an observable impact on the securitization process. This can only be explained by reassessing these actions. In any case these preliminary contradictions within the data indicate that the amount of conditions we were operating with was probably not sufficient.

In **Israel/Palestine** we were considering actions of 35 CoSOs carried out between 1995 and 2009. Over this period of time CoSOs were not only confronted with the very different context conditions and political opportunity structures of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) but also with constantly changing stages of conflict, including periods of low and high intensity conflict as well as phases of de-escalation after active confrontations.

Israel can be characterized by a nationalistic democratic state where human rights are formally given but not respected. Although there is no international presence, the International Community backs human rights financially. While the local civil society in Israel is up to Western standard CoSOs basically sacrifice the acceptance of human rights to the achievement of political aims.

Palestine – being a territory occupied by force – cannot be regarded as a sovereign state. While the local authority can be classified as partly democratic the main authority (Israel) acts against human rights and the territory is characterized by a major international presence. Nevertheless the civil society of the OPT is effectively working and the acceptance of human rights is the basis for the work of most CoSOs. Additionally human rights are financially backed by the International Community.

We basically considered the conflict in Israel/Palestine as a low intensity conflict. High intensity conflict applies to the time of Intifada (from 2000 to 2004), the different violent incursions in Gaza after 2004, the latest Gaza war or particular suicide bombing episodes. Within the OPT we can also speak of a high intensity conflict during the time of the fights between Hamas and Fatah in 2007. A phase of de-escalation after these times of high intensity conflict can last a few days up to a few weeks.

Among the 35 CoSOs we were considering we classified 17 as multi-culturalist, 14 as civic/postnational, three as ethnicist and one as assimilationist. 61 percent of their actions were political, 30 percent cultural/educational and nine percent had been actions in the context of

¹³ 50 percent of these actions have been invocations of an exclusive collective right, another 50 percent were invoking an exclusive individual right.

research/monitoring. 21 percent of these actions led to securitization, 46 percent to de-securitization. 28 percent did not have an observable impact on the securitization process. As in Turkey we were also able to determine actions of failed and prevented securitization in Israel/Palestine.¹⁴

Actions leading to securitization have been carried out by all kinds of CoSOs in all kinds of frameworks of action, yet all of them appeared to be political actions. 80 percent of these actions were invoking an exclusive collective right.¹⁵ Political actions initiated by assimilationist or ethnicist CoSOs always produced securitization. 60 percent of the actions in the framework of escalation did also have a securitizing effect. A significant impact by the different context conditions or political opportunity structures could not be determined.

All of the de-securitizing actions have been actions of multi-culturalist or civic/postnational CoSOs in the framework of resolution or transformation. De-securitization was related to all kinds of invoked rights and – just as securitization – took place in all of the examined areas. Nevertheless the amount of de-securitizing actions within the Gaza Strip is extremely low. While in Israel 55 percent and in the West Bank even 62 percent of all actions led to de-securitization only eight percent of the actions in Gaza were capable of de-securitizing. Furthermore all of the cultural/educational actions taking place in Israel and the West Bank produced de-securitization while in Gaza they did not have any visible impact on the securitization process. A significant impact by the different phases of conflict could neither in Israel nor in the OPT be observed.

Actions not having an observable impact on the securitization process have been actions of multi-culturalist or civic/postnational CoSOs invoking exclusive collective, exclusive individual and inclusive individual rights in the framework of management, resolution or transformation.¹⁶ Most of these actions were political – only 19 percent have been in the field of research/monitoring – so that this result cannot be explained by the content of action. A significant impact by the different context conditions and political opportunity structures could not be determined either.

All of the actions capable of preventing securitization have been actions of civic/postnational or multi-culturalist CoSOs in the framework of transformation invoking an individual right¹⁷. This applies to political actions as well as to cultural/educational ones. While political actions could only prevent securitization by invoking an inclusive individual right, cultural/educational actions could also do so by invoking an exclusive individual right. A significant impact by the context

¹⁴ Four percent of all actions can be regarded as failed securitization. Five percent were capable of preventing securitization.

¹⁵ Apart from that 10 percent of all the securitizing actions have been invocations of an exclusive individual right. Another 10 percent were invoking an inclusive individual right.

¹⁶ Please note that actions in the framework of escalation are listed as failed securitization if they did not have a significant impact on the securitization process.

¹⁷ 67 percent of these actions were invoking an exclusive individual right, 33 percent an inclusive individual one.

conditions and the political opportunity structures could not be observed.

securitizing moves not leading to securitization have been made by ethnicist and multi-culturalist CoSOs invoking a collective right¹⁸. All of these actions were either political actions or actions in the field of research/monitoring. Context conditions and political opportunity structures did not have a significant impact.

In Israel/Palestine we were again – just like in Turkey – confronted with a substantial amount of contradictions within our data. Actions of failed securitization partly emerged from the same conditions as actions leading to securitization. This also applies to de-securitizing actions and actions that did not have a significant impact on the securitization process. In Israel/Palestine even actions of securitization and de-securitization have had the same conditions. Again this indicates that the amount of conditions we were operating with was probably not sufficient.

5. Conclusions

All of the case studies illustrate the causal complexity of ethno-political conflicts and reaffirm that social science can only be capable of understanding its objects by dealing with concepts of multiple conjunctural causation.

While we were able to determine several conditions playing an essential role in the securitization process none of these conditions on its own could produce securitization or de-securitization. The impact of actions could only be understood by considering specific combinations of conditions.

However, there is no general law of (de-)securitization. Comparing the different case studies we have to speak of possibilities rather than necessities. The interaction of different conditions might have increased the probability of a specific outcome but it could not guarantee it. Apart from that the same outcome often emerged from very different preconditions so that the determination of a clear necessary or sufficient condition appeared to be impossible.

Altogether de-securitization and the prevention of securitization were especially linked to cultural/educational actions, actions initiated by multi-culturalist or civic/postnational CoSOs, actions in the framework of transformation and actions invoking an inclusive individual right. Political actions, actions carried out by ethnicist or assimilationist CoSOs, the invocation of an exclusive collective right and the framework of escalation have been rather securitizing factors. Humanitarian actions and actions in the field of research/monitoring tended to have no specific impact on the securitization process. In this context securitizing as well as de-securitizing moves have often not been successful.

¹⁸ 50 percent of these actions have been invocations of an exclusive collective right, another 50 percent were invoking an inclusive collective right.

As mentioned before none of these factors on its own can be regarded as necessary or sufficient condition of an outcome. Yet each (de-)securitizing action was characterized by at least one of these (de-)securitizing conditions and the probability of each outcome seemed to increase the more of these conditions were combined with each other.

Although specific context conditions could – even by comparing all of the case studies – not be determined as generally linked to (de-)securitizing actions, the probability that one specific combination of (de-)securitizing conditions *de facto* leads to (de-)securitization seems to vary from case to case. This means that in some contexts and political opportunity structures the combination of only two conditions might produce a high probability of (de-)securitization while in others not even the combination of three conditions leads to an equal probability so that the same action might lead to de-securitization in one country while in another country it has no visible impact on the securitization process at all. Also the weight of specific conditions seemed to vary from case to case. In Israel for example a political action could lead to securitization even though it was carried out by a civic/postnational CoSO in the framework of transformation invoking an inclusive individual right. In this case the specific content of action could „disable“ three de-securitizing factors. Something like this could not be observed in the other countries. This probably can be explained by the fact that the conflict of Israel/Palestine is considerably more securitized than the others. Therefore we can assume that political actions within the context of highly securitized conflicts have to be considered as extremely risky.

Further examinations would have to focus on the different weights that the generally positive (de-securitizing) and negative (securitizing) factors have in different contexts so that civil society actors in one specific conflict environment could choose their measures more carefully. Nevertheless our comparative study showed that context conditions cannot *per se* prevent securitization or de-securitization. They might restrict or enhance the options available to different political actors but they cannot *a priori* preclude a certain outcome. Therefore CoSOs can succeed in preventing securitization or launching a process of de-securitization – and de-escalation – even though the main context conditions of conflict are not changing.

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